Confirmatory factor analysis of the Dutch intolerance of uncertainty scale: comparison of the full and short version by Helsen, Kim et al.
1 
 
INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis of the Dutch Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale: 
Comparison of the full and short version 
 
Kim Helsen ab, Eva Van den Bussche c, Johan W.S. Vlaeyen ad, Liesbet Goubert b  
 
a*
 Research group of Health Psychology, University of Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, B-
3000 Leuven, Belgium 
b
 Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, 
Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium 
c
 Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Department of Psychology, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, 
Belgium 
d Department of Clinical Psychological Science, Maastricht University, 
Universiteitssingel 40, 6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands 
 
 
Correspondence: Kim Helsen, Research Group on Health Psychology, Tiensestraat 102 bus 3726, 3000 Leuven, 
Belgium. Tel: +32 16 325782. Fax: +32 16 325923. E-mail: Kim.Helsen@ppw.kuleuven.be 
* Institution where the work was performed  
 
E-mail addresses other authors: Eva Van den Bussche: evdbussc@vub.ac.be; Johan W.S. Vlaeyen: 
Johan.Vlaeyen@ppw.kuleuven.be; Liesbet Goubert: Liesbet.Goubert@UGent.be 
 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Background and Objectives. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) was 
developed for assessing reactions to ambiguous situations, uncertainty, and future events. The 
IUS has been validated in different languages, but equivocal factor structures, in combination 
with highly interrelated items and factors, resulted in a redundancy of the items of the English 
version. In the current study, the psychometric properties of the Dutch version of the IUS 
were examined, and compared with the shortened 12-item version (IUS-12).  
Methods. Confirmatory factor analyses were used to investigate different factor 
structures of both the full and short version of the IUS.  
Results. Results indicated that the IUS-12 model with two factors (Prospective 
Anxiety and Inhibitory Anxiety) provides the best fit. The reduced measure has equally good 
internal consistency, and is highly correlated with the full version.  
Limitations. Future research could investigate whether the current findings generalize 
to clinical populations. 
Conclusion. To summarize, the usage of the short 12-item version of the IUS should 
be encouraged in future research concerning intolerance of uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
Worry is a central characteristic of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), but also 
occurs frequently in other mental disorders such as obsessive compulsive disorder (Sica, 
Coradeschi, Sanavio, & Novara, 2004), social anxiety (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009), depression 
(Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010), panic disorder with agoraphobia (Dugas, Marchand, & 
Ladouceur, 2005), post-traumatic stress disorder (Boelen, 2010), eating disorders 
(Konstantellou, Campbell, Eisler, Simic, & Treasure, 2011; Sternheim, Startup, & Schmidt, 
2011), and somatoform disorders (Deacon & Abramowitz, 2008; Boelen & Carleton, 2012). 
In addition, as much as 38% of the general population report to worry at least once a day 
(Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994). Therefore, it is important to identify the key factors 
responsible for the development and maintenance of worry (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). One 
dispositional characteristic that is often associated to both the origin and the continuation of 
worry, is intolerance of uncertainty (IU) (de Bruin, Rassin, van der Heiden, & Muris, 2006; 
Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994), defined by Ladouceur, Gosselin, and Dugas (2000) as “the predisposition 
to react negatively to an uncertain event or situation, independent of its probability of 
occurrence and of its associated consequences” (p. 934). Worriers have difficulty enduring 
uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). For instance, worriers have been shown to display more 
difficulties completing ambiguous tasks compared to non-worriers, operationalized by longer 
decision times in a categorisation task, caused by an increase in disrupting negative thoughts 
(Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990). They also tend to interpret uncertain or 
ambiguous situations in a more threatening way (Butler & Matthews, 1983; Hedayati, Dugas, 
Buhr, & Francis, 2003; Russell & Davey, 1993), needing more information before making a 
decision (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991). Given that ambiguous situations provoke 
uncertainty, and increase the desire for predictability, which is a typical aspect of intolerance 
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of uncertainty specific to worry, these findings suggest that worriers have a lower threshold 
for uncertainty compared to non-worriers (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). In addition, high intolerance 
of uncertainty may lead to impaired problem solving, resulting in inaction or even avoidance 
of ambiguous situations (Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997). Furthermore, cognitive-
behavioural treatment targeting excessive worry in GAD was related to a significant decrease 
in IU over treatment (Ladouceur, Dugas, et al., 2000). Beneficial effects regarding both GAD 
symptoms and IU were still present after a 12-month follow-up period. Results of another 
longitudinal study by Dugas and Ladouceur (2000) showed that changes in IU preceded 
changes in time spent worrying, suggesting that IU might mediate changes in worry during 
GAD treatment. IU was also found to be a better predictor of worry than beliefs about worry, 
negative problem orientation, and cognitive avoidance (Laugesen, Dugas, and Bukowski, 
2003). Moreover, experimental manipulation of IUS was shown to influence the number of 
worrying thoughts (Ladouceur, Gosselin, et al., 2000; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). These 
findings seem to suggest that IU is a causal risk factor for pathological worry (Dugas, et al., 
2005).  
One measure that has often been used to asses IU is the Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale (IUS). The original French version of the IUS was developed to assess “emotional, 
cognitive, and behavioural reactions to ambiguous situations, implications of being uncertain, 
and attempts to control the future” (Freeston, et al., 1994, p. 791). Factor analysis yielded a 
five-factor solution that comprised the following factors: (1) Uncertainty is unacceptable and 
should be avoided, (2) Being uncertain reflects badly on a person, (3) Frustration is related to 
uncertainty, (4) Uncertainty causes stress, and (5) Uncertainty prevents action. IUS scores 
allowed to differentiate between groups of non-clinical subjects, who reported either no GAD 
symptoms, only somatic symptoms, or both somatic and cognitive symptoms. Additionally, 
partial correlation analyses showed that IU accounts for significant variance in worry scores, 
above and beyond the influence of anxiety and depression. Although a 5-factorstructure 
5 
 
emerged from psychometric analysis, high internal consistency justified the use of a single 
summary score of the questionnaire. With regard to the factor analysis of the English version, 
a four-factor structure turned out to be more suitable. These factors were (1) Uncertainty leads 
to the inability to act, (2) Uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, (3) Unexpected events are 
negative and should be avoided, and (4) Being uncertain about the future is unfair (Buhr & 
Dugas, 2002). Validity and reliability measures were comparable to the ones of the French 
version, and consistent among four racial groups (Norton, 2005). However, the factor 
structures in the cross-cultural study were not consistent among groups, with the considerably 
correlated factors suggesting that IU should best be interpreted as a unidimensional construct 
(Norton, 2005). Subsequently, Sexton and Dugas (2009) reinvestigated the factor structure of 
the English IUS, using larger samples. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) identified two 
factors: (1) Uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referent implications, and (2) 
Uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything, which were substantiated by confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). Finally, investigation of the Dutch translation of the 27-item IUS favoured 
the use of a one-factor solution, measuring overall intolerance of uncertainty (de Bruin, et al., 
2006). The instability of the IUS factor structure, despite large sample sizes, in combination 
with high inter-factor correlations, supported redundancy of the items (Norton, 2005). 
Carleton, Norton, and Asmundson (2007) developed an English 12-item version of the IUS. 
This abridged version showed a stable two-factor structure, representing prospective as well 
as inhibitory components of IU. While the former component covers future-related 
uncertainty, the latter involves uncertainty inhibiting action or experience. Psychometric 
properties were similar to the full version’s properties, resulting in a preference of the use of 
the IUS-12 to the full version.  
The aim of the current study was to further examine the utility of the abbreviated 
version of the IUS in a sample of healthy undergraduate students and adults, using the Dutch 
version of the questionnaire. Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted for the unitary, 
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two-, four-, and five-factor structure of the full 27-item version, and compared to the fit of the 
one- and two-factor solutions of the abridged 12-item version. After selection and validation 
of the optimal model, invariance across gender was examined, and psychometric properties of 
this model were investigated. We hypothesized that IU was uniquely related to worry, over 
and above levels of anxiety and depression.  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 967 healthy undergraduate students and adults with a mean age of 
19.55 (SD = 3.65, median = 18, range 14-65). In this sample, 176 were male (18.2%), 784 
were female (81.1%), and seven participants chose not to specify their gender or age (0.7%). 
In the current study, participants only completed the full version of the IUS. Relevant IUS-12 
items were derived afterwards to include in the analyses. In order to investigate validation of 
the IUS, a subsample completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II, N = 470), the Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, N = 521), and the trait version of the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-T, N = 626). Participants signed the informed consent form after being 
informed about the procedure of the study. Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of the University of 
Leuven (Belgium). 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 Intolerance of uncertainty  
IUS-27. The full version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) (Buhr & Dugas, 
2002; de Bruin, et al., 2006; Freeston, et al., 1994) consists of 27 items considering different 
propositions regarding uncertain or ambiguous situations (e.g., ‘I always want to know what 
the future has in store for me’, ‘When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me’). Participants 
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were requested to indicate to what extent they agreed with these propositions (1 = Not at all 
representative; 5 = Completely representative) (see Appendix A). The original French 
version, as well as the translated English and Dutch variations on the IUS, have shown 
satisfactory psychometric properties, with internal consistency ranging from .88 to .94, and 
test-retest reliability scores varying from r = .74 to r = .79 over a four (de Bruin, et al., 2006) 
or five week period (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, et al., 1997; Freeston, et al., 1994). The 
IUS has been used in clinical as well as non-clinical populations (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; 
de Bruin, et al., 2006), most commonly summed as a total scale score (Roemer, 2001), with 
higher scores representing greater intolerance of uncertainty. 
IUS-12. The abbreviated version of the IUS was developed by Carleton et al. (2007) 
(see Appendix B), as a response to the inconsistent findings of several factor analyses using 
different languages (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; de Bruin, et al., 2006; Freeston, et al., 1994) and 
cross-cultural comparisons (Norton, 2005). The abbreviation of the IUS occurred as follows: 
CFA of the different factor structures of the IUS-27 did not provide an adequate fit. 
Consequently, Carleton et al. (2007) selected two factors, one factor of the four-factor model 
(i.e. Uncertainty leading to inability to act) and one of the five-factor structure (i.e. 
Unacceptability and avoidance of uncertainty) based on the principle of item-independence 
(each model had one factor for which the items where shared between all but one of the 
factors in the other model (Carleton, et al., 2007, p. 110)). This resulted in a 17-item 
questionnaire. Subsequently, two items were dropped because of strong correlations with 
another item. The item with the highest factor loading and superior face validity was 
preserved. Finally, three more items were deleted by the authors because they were 
considered to be more strongly related to self-esteem and indecision than to their parent 
factors, yielding a 12-item questionnaire.  
The IUS-12 is highly correlated with the full version (r = .96), and has high internal 
consistency (α = .85) (Carleton, et al., 2007). Two factors can be distinguished: Prospective 
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Anxiety (PA: Future-related fear and anxiety; item 1-7; α = .87), and Inhibitory Anxiety (IA: 
Uncertainty inhibiting action or experience; item 8-12; α = .90) (Carleton, Collimore, & 
Asmundson, 2010).  
2.2.2 Worry 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990; van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999) is a 16-item questionnaire, developed to 
measure trait worry. The items deal with the inclination, intensity and uncontrollability of 
worrying (e.g., ‘Many situations make me worry’, ‘My worries overwhelm me’, ‘Once I start 
worrying, I can’t stop’). Participants are requested to indicate how well the 16 statements 
describe themselves on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not typical at all) to 5 (very 
typical). Items 1, 3, 8, 10, and 11 need to be reverse-scored before computing the total score. 
In most studies worry is considered a unidimensional construct (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 
1992; Meyer, et al., 1990; van Rijsoort, et al., 1999), although confirmatory factor analysis in 
a student population (Fresco, Heimberg, Mennin, & Turk, 2002) indicated that a two factor 
structure, with Worry engagement and Absence of worry as factors, provides a better fit. The 
PSWQ has proven to have good test-retest reliability over an 8-10 week period (Meyer, et al., 
1990). Moreover, high internal consistency of the PSWQ was found for both clinical (α = .86 
- .93) (Brown, et al., 1992) and non-clinical samples (α = .90 - .95) (Davey, 1993; Meyer, et 
al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). Cronbach’s alpha in the current study was excellent (α 
= .92). The PSWQ significantly correlates with depression (Beck Depression Inventory: r = 
.36 - .62) (Meyer, et al., 1990; van Rijsoort, et al., 1999) and anxiety (Trait version of the 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory: r = .64 - .75) (Davey, 1993; Meyer, et al., 1990; van Rijsoort, 
et al., 1999).  
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2.2.3 Depression 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der Does, 
2002) comprises 21 four-choice statements assessing the severity of depressive symptoms 
such as anhedonia, indecisiveness, and feelings of guilt. Participants indicate which of the 
four sentences describes them the best, considering the previous two week period, including 
the day of testing. The total score of the 21 items ranges from 0 to 63, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of depression. Internal consistency of the Dutch version has been 
shown to be excellent in both clinical (α = .92) and student samples (α = .93). In the current 
study, Cronbach’s alpha was .85. 
2.2.4 Anxiety 
Dispositional anxiety was measured by the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-T) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Luschene, 1970; Van der Ploeg, 1980, 1999). 
Participants are required to specify to what extent they generally experience the 20 emotions 
presented (e.g., ‘I feel calm’, ‘I am worried’). Items are scored on a 4-point Likert scale, 
ranging from A (hardly ever) to D (almost always), yielding a total score between 20 and 80. 
Higher scores on the STAI-T represent higher anxiety levels. Test-retest reliability ranges 
from .73 to .86, and the STAI-T has good internal consistency in both students (α = .81) 
(Belzer, D'Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2002), and anxiety disorder patients (α = .89) 
(Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 1998). However, internal consistency in the current study was 
limited (α = .40). 
2.3 Statistical strategy 
The statistical analyses were performed using Amos version 19.0 (Arbuckle, 2010) 
and SPSS 17.0 (SPSS Inc.). We randomly split the full sample of cases into two subsamples, a 
calibration sample (N = 483) and a validation sample (N = 484). The split-sample strategy 
(Browne & Cudeckk, 1993; Cudeck & Browne, 1983) was used for cross-validation. The 
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calibration sample was used to assess the different IUS models. The validation sample was 
used to validate the final best fitting model. First, confirmatory factor analyses were used to 
select the optimal model of the IUS based on the factor structures. Six alternative models, 
which have been previously proposed in the literature (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Carleton, et al., 
2007; de Bruin, et al., 2006; Freeston, et al., 1994; Sexton & Dugas, 2009), were tested using 
the calibration sample. Standardized scores on the constructs were estimated. The Maximum 
Likelihood algorithm was used to assess the fit of the model. In line with theoretical 
recommendations (Bollen & Long, 1993; Byrne, 2001), several fit indices were used to assess 
the model fit: χ2, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), comparative fit index (CFI) and the Consistent 
Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC). A non-significant χ2 value indicates an acceptable 
model (Marsch, Balla, & McDonalds, 1988). Values of RMSEA up to .08 (Browne & 
Cudeckk, 1993), GFI > .90 and AGFI >.85 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1984) and CFI >.90 
(Bentler, 1990) indicate proper fit. The CAIC can be used to compare non-hierarchical as well 
as hierarchical (nested) models, with lower values on the CAIC measure indicating better fit 
(Burnham & Anderson, 1998). 
After selecting the optimal model and validating it using the validation sample, we 
examined whether it was invariant across gender by conducting a multi-sample analysis 
across the full sample (calibration and validation sample). A very restrictive model was tested 
by equating the number of factors, the factor loadings, and the correlations between the 
factors. Internal consistency of the derived optimal model was examined using Cronbach’s 
alpha in the full sample. The construct validity  of the derived optimal model was confirmed 
by examining the association with worry (PSWQ), trait anxiety (STAI-T), and depression 
(BDI-II) in the full sample using Pearson correlations and hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Confirmatory factor analysis 
Using the calibration sample, the model fit of the six IUS models was assessed. Table 
1 summarizes the goodness-of-fit indices of all six models of the IUS. The indices suggest 
that the optimal fit is obtained for a two-factor model of the 12-item version of the IUS 
(Carleton, et al., 2007). This model shows an acceptable fit (χ2(53)=155.89, p<.001; GFI= .95; 
AGFI= .92; CFI= .92; RMSEA= 0.064 (90% CI: 0.053–0.076)). All other models have a 
poorer fit to the data (Table 1), which is also indicated by the CAIC values. Using the 
validation sample, the model of Carleton et al. (2007) was cross-validated. Goodness-of-fit 
indices again indicate a reasonable fit (χ2(53)=127.78, p<.001; GFI= .96; AGFI= .94; CFI= 
.94; RMSEA= 0.055 (90% CI: 0.042–0.067). This indicates that the model was robust across 
two similar samples of healthy undergraduate students and adults. Table 2 shows the 
standardized factor loadings for the validation and the calibration sample. The correlation 
between the two factors was .74 in the calibration sample and .75 in the validation sample. 
3.2 Test of stability of the two-factor model of Carleton et al. (2007) across gender  
To examine whether the two-factor model of Carleton et al. (2007) was invariant 
across gender, a multi-sample analysis was conducted separately for men (N = 171) and 
women (N = 772). The results of the multi-sample analysis showed that the model adequately 
fitted the data: χ2(119)=307.66, p<.001; GFI= .95; AGFI= .93; CFI= .93; RMSEA= 0.041 
(90% CI: 0.035–0.047. This indicates that the model is stable in both samples for the number 
of factors (invariant factor numbers), the intercorrelations between factors (invariant factor 
intercorrelations), and for the contribution of all items to their respective factors (invariant 
factor loadings). 
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3.3 Psychometric properties of the model with the best fit 
3.3.1 Descriptive data 
Descriptive statistics, the internal consistency, and Pearson inter-correlations for the 
different questionnaires and subscales for the total sample are summarized in Table 3. Internal 
consistency of the IUS-12 for the entire sample was excellent (α = .83). Overall, no gender 
differences were found regarding intolerance of uncertainty, F(1,958) = 0.22, p = .64. 
Regarding the subscales, no gender difference was found with respect to Prospective Anxiety, 
F(1,958) = 0.83, p = .36, but women scored significantly higher on Inhibitory Anxiety, 
F(1,958) = 5.44, p = .02. Both factors showed satisfactory internal consistency (α = .72 - .78).  
3.3.2 Construct validity 
Correlations between the IUS-12 and the other questionnaires were all highly 
significant (Table 3). Moreover, scores on the reduced IUS-12 were highly correlated with the 
27-item version of the questionnaire (r = .92). The correlation between the IUS-12 and the 
PSWQ was significantly higher than the correlation between the IUS-12 and the STAI-T 
(rIUS12_PSWQ > rIUS12_STAI-T, Steiger Z = 6.60, p < .01). Both factors were more strongly 
associated with worry compared to anxiety (Prospective Anxiety: rPA_PSWQ > rPA_STAI-T, 
Steiger Z = 5.03, p < .01; Inhibitory Anxiety: rIA_PSWQ > rIA_STAI-T, Steiger Z = 4.64, p < .01). 
No difference was found between rIUS12_PSWQ and rIUS12_BDI-II (Steiger Z = 1.03, ns), although 
Prospective Anxiety showed a stronger correlation with worry compared to depression 
(rPA_PSWQ > rPA_BDI-II, Steiger Z = 2.04, p < .05; Inhibitory Anxiety: rIA_PSWQ = rIA_BDI-II, Steiger 
Z = -1.34, ns).  
A hierarchical regression analysis was performed to investigate the unique 
contribution of the IUS in the explanation of worry (PSWQ) (Table 4). In a first step, gender 
and age were included to control for demographical variables. Next, depression and anxiety 
scores were entered. Finally, either IUS-12 or IUS-27 scores were added to the regression 
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model. Results showed that intolerance of uncertainty significantly contributes to worry, 
above and beyond demographical variables and levels of anxiety and depression. Moreover, 
both versions of the IUS accounted for a similar proportion of the variance in worry scores 
(IUS-12: β = .27, p < .001, R² = .51, ∆R² = .06; IUS-27: β = .28, p < .001, R² = .50, ∆R² = .05). 
Discriminant validity of the two subscales of the IUS-12 was investigated using 
multiple hierarchical regression analyses, successively using symptom measures for worry 
(PSWQ), anxiety (STAI-T), and depression (BDI-II) as criterion variables. In a first step, 
gender and age were entered to control for demographic variables. In a second step, the two 
other symptom measures were included. In a third step, PA and IA were added to the model. 
Results showed that PA explained unique variance in worry (β = .23, p < .001), whereas IA 
was uniquely associated with anxiety (β = .12, p < .05) and depression (β = .34, p < .001). 
4. Discussion 
Previous studies investigating the validity of the IUS did not reveal univocal factor 
solutions. Hence, the purpose of the current study was to compare the different proposed 
factor structures of both the full and shortened Dutch version of the IUS in a sample of 
healthy undergraduate students and adults. Next, psychometric properties of the model with 
the best fit were investigated. Finally, invariance of this model across gender was examined. 
CFA indicated that the IUS-12 model with the two factors Prospective Anxiety and 
Inhibitory Anxiety provided the best fit, corroborating earlier findings (Carleton, et al., 2007; 
McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). Furthermore, the reduced measure had equally good internal 
consistency, accounted for similar proportion of the variance in worry scores, and was highly 
correlated with the 27-item version of the IUS. Internal consistency of both factors was good, 
providing support for the use of the two subscales separately. Considering the high internal 
consistency of the total score, however, the use of a total IU score is also justified.  
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Since intolerance of uncertainty is conceptualized as ‘cognitive, emotional and 
behavioural reactions to uncertainty in everyday life situations’ (Freeston, et al., 1994, p.792), 
it is likely that IU inherently consists of different dimensions, which are represented by 
different factors or subscales. Previous research (Carleton, Mulvogue, Thibodeau, McCabe, 
Antony, & Asmundson, 2012) suggested that Prospective Anxiety tends to focus on the 
cognitive dimension of IU, whereas Inhibitory Anxiety captures the more behaviourally 
focused aspects of IU. The subscales are also considered to measure approach and avoidance 
tendencies respectively (Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011). The PA subscale 
comprises items that represent active seeking for information to reduce unpredictability (e.g. 
‘I should be able to organize everything in advance’), while the IA subscale includes items 
referring to paralysis of cognition and action in uncertain situations (e.g. ‘When it’s time to 
act uncertainty paralyses me’). Results of the current study indicated that both Prospective 
and Inhibitory Anxiety, as well as general IU (IUS-12) showed a stronger relation with worry 
(PWSQ) compared to trait anxiety (STAI-T). This suggests that IU is a more important factor 
for worry than for trait anxiety, and that it might even be a cognitive vulnerability factor for 
the development of persistent worry. These results differed from previous research (de Bruin, 
et al., 2006), using the total score of the IUS-27, in which no evidence was found for a 
difference between these correlations. Additionally, IU seemed to be equally related to worry 
(PSWQ) as to depression (BDI-II). However, when considering both factors separately, PA 
showed a stronger correlation with worry compared to depression, which is not surprising as 
PA comprises future-related fear and anxiety, whereas people suffering from depressive 
symptoms mainly tend to ruminate about the past or present (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). IA, on the other hand, might display considerable overlap with diminished 
activity, as observed in depression. In other words, worry, depression, and anxiety are all 
related to the IU construct, but the strongest overlap with IU was found for worry and 
depression. Another important finding with respect to the subscales in the current study was 
15 
 
that PA turned out to explain unique variance in worry, whereas IA was uniquely associated 
with anxiety and depression, supporting prior research (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). These 
findings may yield implications for differentiated treatment.  
The current study found that intolerance of uncertainty contributes to the prediction of 
worry, over and above demographical variables and levels of anxiety and depression, 
emphasizing its unique contribution concerning the prediction of worry. These findings are in 
line with previous research, which has demonstrated that IU is associated with worry and 
GAD (Laugesen, et al., 2003), and might even be a causal risk factor for pathological worry 
and GAD (Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005). IU enables to distinguish GAD patients 
from non-GAD anxious individuals (Dugas, Freeston, et al., 1998; Ladouceur, et al., 1999), 
panic disorder patients with agoraphobia (Dugas, et al., 2005), and non-clinical controls 
(Ladouceur, et al., 1999). Several processes have been proposed concerning the mechanisms 
through which IU would give rise to pathological worry (Birrell et al., 2011; Dugas, Buhr, et 
al., 2004; Dugas, Gagnon, et al., 1998). First, IU might increase levels of positive beliefs 
about worry (e.g., worrying will lead to a solution), which in turn results in increased levels of 
worrying (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008). Second, IU might give rise to negative problem 
orientation, disturbing appraisals of the problem (Koerner & Dugas, 2008) and problem 
solving abilities, due to lack of confidence. Subsequently, negative problem orientation 
interferes with actual problem solving, thereby increasing levels of worry and anxiety (Dugas, 
Buhr, et al., 2004). A third putative process accounting for the association between IU and 
worry is cognitive avoidance (Dugas, Gagnon, et al., 1998). When focusing on linguistic 
thoughts, one can avoid presentation of mental images, which are considered unpleasant, and 
are shown to cause somatic arousal. However, this avoidance strategy might prevent 
emotional processing of the threatening situation, further increasing threat value of the 
images. This in turn may lead to the maintenance of worry. A fourth possible mediating 
mechanism is through an increase of perceived threat, which can be translated into 
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overestimation of both the likelihood and negative consequences of negative outcomes 
(Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008; Chen & Hong, 2010; Dugas, Buhr, et al., 2004). 
However, IU is found be related to other pathologies as well. Research including 
clinical (Sica, et al., 2004; Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & 
Foa, 2003) as well as non-clinical samples (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Dugas, Gosselin, & 
Ladouceur, 2001; Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006) has shown that IU may also be 
involved in obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). Steketee et al. (1998) demonstrated that IU 
was a strong predictor for the severity of OCD symptoms. Tolin and colleagues (2003) argued 
that the relationship between IU and OCD was most prominent in patients displaying 
checking and repeating compulsions. Pathological doubt, being one of the core features of 
OCD, is most pronounced in individuals displaying checking rituals. Whereas decreased 
memory confidence might reflect the more cognitive component of pathological doubt, IU 
may represent the more emotional feature of pathological doubt in OCD patients (Tolin, et al., 
2003). Furthermore, Boelen and Reijntjes (2009) reported that IU is not only related to 
symptoms of GAD and OCD, but that IU is also associated with social anxiety (SA). This 
corroborates findings by Carleton, Collimore, et al. (2010), who particularly demonstrated the 
importance of the relationship between the Inhibitory Anxiety component of the IU construct 
and SA. Other pathologies that have been associated with IU are panic disorder (PD) (Dugas, 
Gagnon, et al., 1998; Dugas, et al., 2001; Tolin, et al., 2003), state anxiety (Chen & Hong, 
2010; Greco & Roger, 2001), obsessive compulsive personality disorder (Gallagher, South, & 
Oltmanns, 2003), eating disorders (Konstantellou, et al., 2011; Sternheim, et al., 2011), and 
somatoform disorders (Deacon & Abramowitz, 2008; Boelen & Carleton, 2012). However, 
IU does not seem to be critical for depressive disorders (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Dugas, 
Schwartz, & Francis, 2004). 
Given that IU plays a central role in both the development and maintenance of several 
disorders (Carleton, Collimore, et al., 2010; Holaway, et al., 2006; Tolin, et al., 2003), 
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targeting IU is likely to reduce symptoms as well. For instance, increasing non-clinical 
individuals’ tolerance of uncertainty may help preventing the development of GAD (Dugas, et 
al., 2001). Moreover, research has indicated that cognitive-behavioural treatment targeting IU 
is effective in reducing excessive worry in GAD patients (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas, 
et al., 2003; Ladouceur, Dugas, et al., 2000), but also results in relief of SAD symptoms 
(Carleton, Collimore, et al., 2010; Mahoney and McEvoy, 2012), as many social-evaluative 
situations comprise a great deal of uncertainty (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). As mentioned 
earlier, individuals’ scores on the subscales of the IUS may indicate which treatment 
strategies are most appropriate for a particular person (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). 
Individuals scoring high on Prospective Anxiety might benefit most from re-evaluation of 
erroneous beliefs about worry, whereas individuals with high Inhibitory Anxiety may profit 
more from specific cognitive-behavioural techniques such as problem orientation training and 
exposure to uncertainty (Birrell et al, 2011; Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Ladouceur, Dugas, et 
al., 2000). The former technique implies focusing on the core issues of one’s problems, as 
individuals with high intolerance of uncertainty often lose themselves in irrelevant details in 
an attempt to reduce uncertainty. Subsequently, participants are stimulated to proceed with the 
problem-solving process even if the outcome is unsure in advance. The latter technique 
involves exposure to threat-related and uncertain situations. Imaginary exposure can be used 
in addition to exposure in vivo in order to maintain therapeutic gains (Foa, Steketee, Turner, 
& Fischer, 1980). Application of such exercises might result in habituation to feelings of 
uncertainty, and enhancement of (perceived) self-efficacy to tolerate feelings of uncertainty 
(Tolin, et al., 2003). Furthermore, IU can be used as an outcome measure for treatment of 
several anxiety disorders (Carleton, Collimore, et al., 2010; Carleton, Gosselin, & 
Asmundson, 2010), since previous research has demonstrated that treatment outcome is 
highly associated with changes in intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; 
Ladouceur, Dugas, et al., 2000). 
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Although the results of this study are promising, a few limitations need to be 
considered. First, the sample largely consisted of women (81.1%). Although no gender 
differences were found for IU in general, and factor solutions were consistent among both 
genders, women reported more Inhibitory Anxiety than men. Additionally, gender differences 
were found for the other measures (PSWQ, and BDI-II), with women scoring higher than 
men, supporting earlier findings (Bender, et al., 2006; Dugas, et al., 1997; Dugas, et al., 2001; 
Haba-Rubio, 2005; Stavosky & Borkovec, 1988). Second, only healthy individuals 
participated in the study. Consequently, the current findings may not generalize to clinical 
samples, although previous studies suggested that psychometric properties of the IUS were 
comparable in clinical and non-clinical samples (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; McEvoy & 
Mahoney, 2011). Finally, one might consider adjusting the names of the subscales into 
Prospective and Inhibitory Intolerance of Uncertainty, as IU is proven to be a transdiagnostic 
concept, not specific to anxiety (Boelen et al., 2012; Carleton et al., 2012; McEvoy & 
Mahoney, 2011). Other possible labels arising from a recent review study (Birrell et al, 2011) 
are Desire for predictability and an active engagement in seeking certainty, and Paralysis of 
cognition and action in the face of uncertainty respectively. 
To summarize, the current study provided evidence for the utility of the shortened 
version of the IUS. These findings are in line with the results of Carleton et al. (2007), who 
examined the English version of this questionnaire. Additionally, the use of the two separate 
subscales might provide a steppingstone for successful treatment of different mental 
disorders. As a consequence, the application of the psychometrically sound IUS-12 should be 
encouraged in future research regarding intolerance of uncertainty. 
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Appendix A: Dutch items and instructions of the IUS-27 
De onderstaande vragen gaan over hoe u tegen onzekerheden aankijkt. Beantwoord de vragen 
door steeds het betreffende getal te omcirkelen. Er zijn geen goede of foute antwoorden. Het 
gaat steeds om uw mening. 
 
De getallen hebben de volgende betekenis: 
1 = sterk mee oneens 
2 = mee oneens 
3 = eens noch oneens 
4 = mee eens 
5 = sterk mee eens 
  sterk 
mee 
oneens 
mee  
oneens 
eens 
noch 
oneens 
mee 
eens 
sterk  
mee 
eens 
1. Onzekerheid belet mij om een uitgesproken mening te hebben. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Onzeker zijn duidt op ongeorganiseerdheid. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Onzekerheid maakt het leven ondragelijk. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Het is oneerlijk om geen garanties in het leven te hebben. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Ik kan niet tot rust komen als ik niet weet wat er morgen  
gaat gebeuren. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Door onzekerheid voel ik me ongemakkelijk, angstig, of gespannen. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Onvoorziene gebeurtenissen brengen mij ernstig van slag. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Ik vind het frustrerend om niet over alle benodigde informatie  
te beschikken. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Onzekerheid belet mij om het beste uit het leven te halen. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Men moet altijd vooruitkijken om verrassingen te voorkomen. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. De kleinste onvoorziene gebeurtenis kan alles verpesten, ondanks  
de beste planning. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
12. Als ik in actie moet komen, voel ik me verlamd door onzekerheid. 1 2 3 4 5 
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13. Onzeker zijn duidt erop dat ik niet ‘eerste klasse’ ben. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Als ik onzeker ben, kan ik niet vooruit. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Als ik onzeker ben, kan ik niet goed functioneren. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. In tegenstelling tot mijzelf, lijken andere mensen te weten waar  
ze naar toe gaan met hun leven. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
17. Onzekerheid maakt me kwetsbaar, ongelukkig, of verdrietig. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Ik wil altijd weten wat de toekomst in petto heeft voor me. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Ik kan er niet tegen om verrast te worden. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Zelfs de kleinste twijfel kan mij ervan weerhouden tot actie over  
te gaan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Ik zou in staat moeten zijn om alles vooraf te organiseren. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. Onzeker zijn duidt erop dat ik een gebrek aan zelfvertrouwen heb. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. Ik vind het oneerlijk dat andere mensen zeker lijken te zijn over  
hun toekomst. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
24. Onzekerheid weerhoudt me van een goede nachtrust. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. Ik moet alle onzekere situaties vermijden. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. De dubbelzinnigheden in het leven stresseren me. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. Ik kan er niet tegen om besluitloos te zijn over mijn toekomst. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix B: Dutch items and instructions of the short version IUS-12 
De onderstaande vragen gaan over hoe u tegen onzekerheden aankijkt. Beantwoord de vragen 
door steeds het betreffende getal te omcirkelen. Er zijn geen goede of foute antwoorden. Het 
gaat steeds om uw mening. 
 
De getallen hebben de volgende betekenis: 
1 = sterk mee oneens 
2 = mee oneens 
3 = eens noch oneens 
4 = mee eens 
5 = sterk mee eens 
  
 
 
sterk 
mee 
oneens 
mee  
oneens 
eens 
noch 
oneens 
mee 
eens 
sterk  
mee 
eens 
1. Onvoorziene gebeurtenissen brengen mij ernstig van slag. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Ik vind het frustrerend om niet over alle benodigde informatie  
te beschikken. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
3. Men moet altijd vooruitkijken om verrassingen te voorkomen. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. De kleinste onvoorziene gebeurtenis kan alles verpesten, ondanks 
 de beste planning. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Ik wil altijd weten wat de toekomst in petto heeft voor me. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Ik kan er niet tegen om verrast te worden. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Ik zou in staat moeten zijn om alles vooraf te organiseren. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Onzekerheid belet mij om het beste uit het leven te halen. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Als ik in actie moet komen, voel ik me verlamd door onzekerheid. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Als ik onzeker ben, kan ik niet goed functioneren.  1 2 3 4 5 
11. Zelfs de kleinste twijfel kan mij ervan weerhouden tot actie over  
te gaan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Ik moet alle onzekere situaties vermijden. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Table 1. Confirmatory factor analyses fit indices for the different IUS versions 
 
χ
2(df), p GFI AGFI CFI RMSEA (90% CI) CAIC 
IUS-27a, 1 factor χ2(324)=1262,94, p<.001 .80 .76 .75 .079 (.074-.084) 1648.61 
IUS-27a, 2 factors χ2(323)=1023.37, p<.001 .85 .82 .81 .068 (.064-.073) 1416.18 
IUS-27a, 4 factors χ2(318)=1090.33, p<.001 .84 .80 .79 .072 (.068-.077) 1518.85 
IUS-27a, 5 factors χ2(286)=769.01, p<.001 .88 .85 .86 .060 (.055-.065) 1233.24 
IUS-12a, 1 factor χ2(54)=236.96, p<.001 .91 .87 .86 .085 (.074-.096) 408.93 
IUS-12a, 2 factors χ2(53)=155.89, p<.001 .95 .92 .92 .064 (.053-.076) 334.92 
IUS-12b, 2 factors χ2(53)=127.78, p<.001 .96 .94 .94 .055 (.042-.067) 306.92 
Note. a = Calibration sample (N=483), b = Validation sample (N=484).  
GFI = goodness-of-fit index, AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index, CFI = comparative fit index, 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, and CAIC = the Consistent Akaike Information 
Criterion. 
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Table 2. Standardized factor loadings of the two-factor model for the 12-item IUS (Carleton, Norton, 
and Asmundson, 2007) as obtained with confirmatory factor analysis shown for the validation sample 
and the calibration sample (between parentheses) 
Item  Item content prospective anxiety inhibitory anxiety 
1 Unforeseen events upset me greatly. .62 (.63)  
2 It frustrates me not having all the information I need. .50 (.60)  
3 One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises. .62 (.52)  
4 A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with 
the best planning. 
.51 (.53)  
5 I always want to know what the future has in store for me. .63 (.62)  
6 I can’t stand being taken by surprise. .60 (.54)  
7 I should be able to organize everything in advance. .57 (.68)  
8 Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life.  .58 (.57) 
9 When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me.  .68 (.59) 
10 When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well.  .49 (.44) 
11 The smallest doubt can stop me from acting.  .66 (.67) 
12 I must get away from all uncertain situations.  .57 (.56) 
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Table 3. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD), Cronbach’s alpha (α), number of participants (N), and Pearson inter-correlations of the 
Questionnaires 
Variable M SD α N 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. IUS-12_PA 17.85 5.00 .78 967 .55** .92** .78** .38** .46** .22** 
2. IUS-12_IA 11.57 3.56 .72 967 1 .83** .86** .51** .46** .24** 
3. IUS-12_total score 29.41 7.56 .83 967  1 .92** .48** .52** .26** 
4. IUS-27_total score 67.77 15.20 .90 967   1 .57** .55** .25** 
5. BDI-II 10.44 7.05 .85 470    1 .54** .12** 
6. PSWQ 50.74 12.61 .92 521     1 .39** 
7. STAI-T 48.92 4.81 .40 626      1 
Note. IUS-12_PA = Prospective anxiety, IUS-12_IA = Inhibitory anxiety, IUS-12_total score = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale short 12-
item version, IUS-27_total score = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (full 27-item version), BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, PSWQ = 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire, STAI-T = trait version of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory.  
** p< .01. 
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Table 4. Hierarchical regression analysis: Intolerance of Uncertainty significantly contributes to worry 
(PSWQ) above and beyond demographical variables and levels of depression and anxiety 
Variables R² ∆R² B SE B β 
Step 1 .09*** .09***    
Gender   9.63 1.47 .30*** 
Age   0.14 0.16 .04 
Step 2 .45*** .37***    
BDI-II   0.84 0.06 .47*** 
STAI-T   0.87 0.09 .33*** 
Step 3 .51*** .06***    
IUS-12   0.46 0.06 .27*** 
Step 3 .50*** .05***    
IUS-27   0.23 0.03 .28*** 
Note. IUS-12 = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (short 12-item version), IUS-27 = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (full 27-item version), BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire, STAI-T = trait version of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. R² = The proportion of 
variance accounted for by the model, ∆R²  = Additional change in the proportion of variance accounted 
for by the model, B = regression coefficient ,SE B  = standard error of B, β = standardized regression 
coefficient. 
*** p<.001. 
